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1 Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed the creation and di¤usion of Codes of Best Practice
(or Codes of Corporate Governance) all around the world. A Code of Best Practice is a
list of rules promoted by a regulator suggesting how a rm should supervise management.1
Codes recommendations cover a wide range of Corporate Governance issues: for exam-
ple, board structure, executive compensation, as well as the role played by institutional
investors and capital structure (Bolton et al., 2002). Yet, the two most relevant features
shared by any Code of Best Practice are, rst, its voluntary nature2 and, second, that
they aim to improve managers oversight.3
In this paper, we analyze the implementation of Codes in markets where possibly het-
erogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. We study which
rms use a Code and how this depends on the characteristics of the set of shareholders
and managers, as well as each rms output market. We model each rm as an agency
relationship (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), where each shareholder hires one manager to
conduct her project. A shareholder can hire a manager either through an incentive con-
tract or through a contract that includes a Code of Best Practice. The success of each
project depends on the decisions taken by the manager and also on product market con-
ditions. Both shareholder and manager know the (ex-ante) distribution of the market
conditions parameter; however, only the manager learns the actual realization of the
market conditions once the contract has been signed.
The adoption of the Code is a mechanism that allows the shareholder to reduce man-
agers discretion (see, for instance, Dahya et al., 2002). However, this improvement in
Boards control goes along with a decrease in exibility at the managers decision level.
We model this trade-o¤ in a simple way: managerspayment depends on the nal outcome
if he is hired through an incentive contract while a Code allows the shareholder to propose
1The introduction of Codes of Best Practice was leaded by the Cadbury Report (1992).
2In some countries, the legislation asks rms either to comply with each rule or to explain why they
do not comply (comply or explainprinciple).
3See, for instance, Aguilera et al. (2004) and European Commission (2001) for the number and
di¤usion of Codes of Best Practice. See also IOSCO (2006) for a recent survey of compliance with Board
Independence rules proposed by OECD (2004). Nowadays, OECD (2004) can be considered the standard
for Codes of Best Practice.
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a contract specifying (ex-ante) the managers decisions.4 Thus, a shareholder chooses be-
tween a contract that easily adjusts to the environment but requires paying informational
rents (an incentive contract) and a contract that allows to reduce managers informational
rents but imposes large costs if shareholders predictions over the market conditions were
erroneous since no adjustment is possible (a Code contract).
In the study of one isolated partnership, we show that a Code is more likely to arise
when projects are highly protable, managers are e¢ cient, have low exogenous outside
opportunities and there is low variance in market conditions.
The main purpose of our paper is the analysis of the adoption of Codes in environments
where shareholders compete for managers, where the identity of matched partners, and
not only the contract, is endogenous rather than exogenous. With this purpose, we follow
the approach adopted in Dam and Pérez-Castrillo (2006) and Serfes (forthcoming) and
we model a two-sided market where the transaction takes the form of a contract (instead
of an object or a monetary transfer).5 We take stability as the solution concept for this
market. An outcome (i.e., a matching between shareholders and managers and a set of
contracts) is stable if it can not be blocked by a shareholder-manager pair who would sign
a more protable contract for both parties.6
The analysis of the shareholder-manager competitive market gives rise to several inter-
esting results. First, in environments with shareholders own projects of di¤erent expected
return while all managers have the same ability to conduct them, Codes are adopted by
those shareholders owning the best projects. Second, also in this type of environment,
identical managers end up with quite di¤erent ex-post utilities due to two di¤erent fac-
4Similar to Alonso-Paulí (2007), we consider that the adoption of the Code allows the shareholder
to reduce managers discretion. In Alonso-Paulí (2007), adopting the Code prevents the manager from
taking certain (bad) actions. In this paper, adopting the Code lets the shareholder choose which actions
the manager will take.
5Dam and Pérez-Castrillo (2006) fully characterize a market with homogeneous principals and hetero-
geneous agents enjoying limited liability, whereas Serfes (forthcoming) analyzes a market with heteroge-
neous principals and agents with CARA utility functions. See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a general
presentation of matching markets with and without money.
6Stability and competitive equilibrium are very close concepts (for matching models where the parties
decide on money instead of contracts see, for instance, Shapley and Shubik, 1972, Roth and Sotomayor,
1990, and Pérez-Castrillo and Sotomayor, 2002). Any stable outcome is also a competitive equilibrium
and viceversa.
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tors: a) managers signing contracts including Codes obtain lower utility than managers
signing incentive contracts, and b) managers being hired through incentive contracts by
shareholders with better projects also obtain higher utility. Third, when the market is
composed by homogeneous shareholders and heterogeneous managers, the best managers
are hired through incentive contracts in such a way that the Code of Best Practice is
not implemented in the relationships involving top managers (contrary to the conclusion
obtained in the analysis of an isolated relationship).
Fourth, when both sides are formed by heterogeneous agents, we provide conditions un-
der which the matching is positively assortative, that is, shareholders with better projects
hire better managers. This is always the case when either all the contracts (in a stable
outcome) are based on incentives, or they all include Codes. We also show cases where the
coexistence of incentive contracts and contracts including Codes makes that the matching
is not positively assortative. In particular, a shareholder with a good project may opt
for a contract including a Code of Best Practice, attracting a less e¢ cient manager when
the more e¢ cient is too expensivebecause he is being hired in the market through an
incentive contract. Finally, we discuss the welfare e¤ects of introducing Codes of Best
Practice. Albeit its voluntary nature, the use of Codes is not always welfare enhancing.
We nd that, in general, introducing Codes tends to be welfare enhancing if the environ-
ment faced by the rms displays a low variance, while it decreases welfares in environment
with intermediate variance.
The literature dealing with Codes of Best Practice is still very scarce. With regard to
the theoretical literature, only Alonso-Paulí (2007) deals with the analysis of Codes. He
concentrates on the e¤ect of its adoption on managersincentives and studies the design
(by a regulator) of the optimal Code. Empirical literature has been developing along with
the creation of Codes of Best Practice. It investigates the relation between Corporate
Governance provisions and its e¤ect on rms performance. This analysis has not reached
a consensus in its conclusions. For instance, while Arcot and Bruno (2006), Gompers et
al. (2003) and Fernández and Gómez (2002) nd positive e¤ects of the adoption of the
Code in US, UK and Spain, respectively, Nowak et al. (2004) and De Jong et al. (2006),
nd no e¤ect of Codes recommendations for Germany and The Netherlands, respectively.
Our paper follows a long tradition of studies on the e¤ect of several Corporate Gov-
ernance mechanisms. Following Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Corporate Governance deals
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with the ways in which the suppliers of nance to corporations assure themselves of getting
a return on their investment. Berle and Means (1930) were the rst to analyze modern
corporations highlighting the potential weaknesses generated by the separation between
dispersed owners of the corporation and its managers. The literature has extensively ana-
lyzed the use of mechanisms such as takeovers, large shareholders, boards of directors and
managers compensation to solve the agency problem between shareholders and managers.
Our paper contributes to this literature by analyzing a di¤erent mechanism: the Codes
of Best Practice.
Regarding the disciplinary role of the market, the inuential papers by Grossman and
Hart (1980) and Scharfstein (1988) study the main e¤ects of the threat of takeovers and
establish the takeover guidelines for this mechanism to be e¤ective. On the role played
by large shareholders, Admati et al. (1994) and Huddart (1993) show that they tend to
under-monitor because they balance the benets from monitoring the manager with the
costs of having undiversied portfolios. On the contrary, over-monitoring may arise in
presence of specic investments (Aghion and Tirole, 1997, Burkart et al., 1997) or similarly
if shareholders may enjoy private benets of control (La Porta et al., 1998). Hermalin and
Weisbach (1998) and Adams and Ferreira (2007) have developed important contributions
to understand the functioning of the board of directors. The former analyzes the process
by which directors get selected and the inuence of the manager on this process. The
latter studies the monitoring and the advising tasks developed by any board of directors.
Finally, the role played by an appropriately chosen executive compensation scheme has
been extensively studied (see, for instance, the pioneer work by Jensen and Meckling,
1976, and the paper by Baker et al., 1988) and has been nicely summarized in Murphy
(1999).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the main features of
the model and the corresponding solution concept. The properties that the contract
displays in stable outcomes are stated in Section 3. Section 4 studies particular manager-
shareholder markets and provides characteristics for the most general environment. The
welfare e¤ect of introducing Codes is discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes
and discuses some extensions of the model. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
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2 The Model
2.1 Shareholders and Managers
We consider the market for managers where n risk neutral shareholders S = fs1; s2; s3; :::; sng
meet N risk neutral managersM = fm1;m2;m3; :::;mNg. We denote shareholders by s,
si, si0, etc. and, similarly, managers are represented by m, mj, mj0, etc. Each shareholder
owns a project but she lacks the skills to develop it. Instead, each manager has the ability
to conduct one project. Thus, shareholders and managers have to match in pairs to carry
out projects and a contract is signed for each partnership with this objective. Managers
enjoy limited liability over income, their wage can not be negative in any contingency.
Both shareholders and managers may be heterogeneous agents. Shareholders may dif-
fer in the protability of the project they own while managers may diverge in their ability
to conduct shareholdersprojects. We allow for the possibility that both shareholders and
managers can seek for alternative partners and sign new contracts. Hence, the matching
between shareholders and managers will be endogenous.
2.2 Projects
Once a shareholder-manager pair is formed, a rm is constituted and the manager is
in charge of taking decisions concerning the project. We assume for simplicity that
projects are independent in the sense that, once constituted, a rms prots only de-
pend on decisions taken in that rm. The project yields a revenue Ri > 0 for shareholder
si if it is successful, whereas the asset has value 0 in case of failure. The value of Ri,
for i = 1; :::n; is public information. Without loss of generality, we order projects as
R1  R2  :::  Rn > 0. The probability of success of the project depends on the
managers decision or e¤ort e and on some random shock h. In particular, we assume
that the probability of success is eh.
Manager mjs e¤ort is his own private information and it has a cost cj(e) = cj e
2
2
, with
cj > 0. Managersability (the inverse of cj) is public information, and we order managers
depending on their ability: 0 < c1  c2  :::  cN ; that is, a lower index corresponds to
a more e¢ cient manager.
The random variable h represents the uncertainty in the output market of a project.
This industry-specic component can reect di¤erences among sectors, countries, etc. It is
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ex-ante unknown to both parties. It is common knowledge that h is distributed according
to F (h) on the interval

h; h

and it is revealed only to the manager after he accepts the
contract and before he decides on the e¤ort.7 We denote (h) =
Z h
h
hdF (h) the mean
of the random shock. Also, we denote (h) =
Z h
h
h2dF (h) so that the variance of the
distribution of h is V ar(h) = (h)  (h)2.
We denote by fS;M;R; cg the market for managers and shareholders, where R 
(R1; R2; :::; Rn) denotes the vector of shareholdersprojects and c  (c1; c2; :::; cn) corre-
sponds to the vector of managersabilities.
2.3 Contracts and payo¤s
When shareholder si and manager mj form a rm, they sign the contract that will govern
their relationship. The contract can take two forms. It can be based on an incentive
scheme (IS contract) or it can include a Code of Best Practices (CBP contract).
If the rm (si;mj) signs an IS contract, it has the form W ISsi;mj = (wR; w0). The
rst component of the contract wR is the transfer to the manager in case revenue Ri
is obtained, the second part of the contract w0 is the transfer in case of failure, when
the result is 0. Under contract (wR; w0), the manager will select the e¤ort once he has
observed the realization of the market conditions, h. He will select the contingent e¤ort
e(wR; w0;h) that maximizes his utility, i.e.,
e(wR; w0;h) = argmaxfw0 + he(wR   w0)  cj e
2
2
g,
which implies that the level of e¤ort is:
e(wR; w0;h) =
h
cj
(wR   w0). (ICC)
The previous equation represents the Incentive Compatibility Constraint (ICC). It states
that the manager tends to exert a higher level of e¤ort if the bonus is large (wR  w0), if
the market condition is particularly protable (high h), or if he has good skills (low cj).
7An alternative interpretation for the random variable h is that the value of success is industry-specic
(hR) rather than the probability of success being industry-specic (he). This interpretation yields the
same projects expected value.
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Alternatively, the rm (si;mj) can sign a CBP contract. A CBP is a monitoring
technology that allows the shareholder to gather better information about the managers
decisions. We model the adoption of a Code in a very simple way. We assume that
the boards control allows to make the managers decisions ex-ante contractual, i.e., the
shareholder can ask the manager for an specic level of e¤ort. Albeit managers decisions
are ex-ante contractible, shareholders do not know still the realization of the market
conditions h. Therefore, the agency problem between the manager and the shareholder
is not fully solved. A CBP contract for rm (si;mj) is then a vector WCBPsi;mj = (wR; w0; e)
that species the payment to the manager in case of success and failure of the project, as
well as the e¤ort he must exert.
Any contract must be acceptable for both the manager and the shareholder. Both
agents must be better o¤ signing the contract than not signing any contract. This is a
necessary condition that requires that they are better under the contract than staying
apart from the market. Contract Wsi;mj is acceptable for shareholder si if it o¤ers her
non-negative prots. It is acceptable for manager mj if his expected utility under Wsi;mj
is not lower than the utility he would obtain by exiting the market. We call this the
outside utility and denote it U . We write the previous Acceptability constraints as
follows:
si(mj;Wsi;mj)  0, (PCs)
Vmj(si;Wsi;mj)  U , (PCm)
where si(mj;Wsi;mj) is shareholder sis expected prots and Vmj(si;Wsi;mj) is manager
mjs expected utility when they sign the contract Wsi;mj .
Furthermore, contracts have to satisfy managers limited liability which implies the
following constraints:
wR  0, (LLR)
w0  0. (LL0)
Contracts which are not acceptable for one of the parties or that do not satisfy limited
liability constraints will be discarded by either the shareholder or the manager. We say
that they are feasible contracts:
Denition 1 A contract Wsi;mj is feasible for (si;mj) if it satises the acceptability and
limited liability constraints (PCs), (PCm), (LLR), and (LL0).
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2.4 Matching
In our model, the identity of the partners in any rm is endogeneous. A manager will
not only chose between signing a contract with a particular shareholder or staying out of
the market, but he also has the option to form a rm with any other shareholder. We
will represent the identity of the partners forming rms through a matching function that
associates shareholders with managers. We now describe a matching in this economy.
Denition 2 A (one-to-one) matching for the market fS;M;R; cg is a mapping  :
S [M  ! S [M such that (i) (si) 2 M[ fsig for all si 2 S, (ii) (mj) 2 S [ fmjg
for all mj 2M, and (iii) (si) = mj if and only if (mj) = si for all (si;mj) 2 S M.
A matching is a function that describes which rms are formed. Every pair involving
a particular shareholder and a particular manager is a rm. That is, the rm (si;mj) is
formed under the matching function  if (si) = mj (or, analogously, (mj) = si). The
matching function also indicates when an agent (shareholder or manager) is not involved
in any rm.
In addition, we need to describe which contract governs any relationship. The only
requisite is that contracts within a rm must be feasible.
Denition 3 A menu of contracts W compatible with a matching  for the market
fS;M;R; cg is a vector of feasible contracts, one for each rm formed under .
A matching and a set of contracts determine a possible organization of our market
that we will refer to as an outcome.
Denition 4 An outcome (;W) for the market fS;M;R; cg is a matching  and a
menu of contracts W compatible with :
The objective of our paper is to characterize the equilibrium outcomes in the share-
holders/managers market. That is, we identify the characteristics of both, the contracts
emerging and the rms formed. First, contracts signed between shareholders and man-
agers are endogenous. In the traditional analysis of agency problems between managers
and shareholders, the literature has thoroughly analyzed the properties of contracts in an
isolated principal/agent relationship. Second, we also require that the matching itself is
endogenous.
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To be an equilibrium, the outcome (;W) shall be immune to potential blocking from
any shareholder-manager pair (as it is immune, according to our denition of feasible
contracts, to blocking from any individual). This idea corresponds to the concept of
stability. It states that it is not sensible to expect (;W) to be an (stable or equilibrium)
outcome of the market if there exists any shareholder-manager pair that can form a rm by
signing a feasible contract such that both the shareholder and the manager are better-o¤
under the new deal compared to the initial situation (;W).
Denition 5 An outcome (;W) for the market fS;M;R; cg is stable if there does not
exist any pair (si;mj) and any contract W 0 feasible for (si;mj) such that si(mj;W
0) >
si((si);Wsi;(si)) and Vmj(si;W
0) > Vmj((mj);W(mj);mj).
Stability requires that there does not exist any shareholder-manager pair that can
block the current outcome, signing a feasible contractW 0 for them. Furthermore, since all
contracts in a stable outcome are feasible, a stable outcome is also individually rational.
3 Contracts in a stable outcome
In this section, we have a rst look at the characteristics of contracts signed in stable
outcomes of market fS;M;R; cg. The rst characteristic implied by stability is that it is
not possible for the partners of any existing rm to sign an alternative contract that both
nd better than the current contract since, otherwise, it would exist a protable deviation
for the partners. That is, contracts in a stable outcome are Pareto optimal among those
feasible contracts that satisfy (in case of incentive contracts) incentive constraints. We
refer to this notion as (constrained) Pareto Optimality; it is formalized in the following
denition.
Denition 6 A contract Wsi;mj for a rm (si;mj) is constrained Pareto optimal if
there is no other feasible contract W 0 for (si;mj) such that si(mj;W
0)  si(mj;Wsi;mj)
and Vmj(si;W
0)  Vmj(si;Wsi;mj); with at least one strict inequality.
Proposition 1 states the optimality property.
Proposition 1 All the contracts in a stable outcome for the market fS;M;R; cg are
constrained Pareto optimal.
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The property of constrained Pareto optimality allows to identify any contract in a
stable outcome once we know the identity of the partners (si;mj) and the utility obtained
by manager mj. Indeed, the contract is the one that maximizes shareholder sis expected
prots under the constraint that manager mj gets this utility level.
In the rest of the section, we will characterize the best contract from shareholder
sis point of view as a function of any possible reservation utility level U j which has
to be achieved by the manager. We denote such a contract as Wsi;mj(U j).
8 Note that
the level U j will be an equilibrium reservation utility level, determined by the possibility
that manager si forms a partnership with other shareholders, when we will perform the
complete analysis of stable outcomes in next section.
Remember that the contract Wsi;mj(U j) either takes the form of an Incentive Scheme
contract W ISsi;mj(U j) or a Code of Best Practice contract W
CBP
si;mj
(U j). We rst identify the
contract if (si;mj) sign W ISsi;mj(U j) then, we calculate the best contract including a CBP
WCBPsi;mj (U j) and nally, as a function of the reservation utility U j, we state which type of
contract is chosen.
Under an IS contract, limited liability constraint (LL0) makes the incentive condition
(ICC) costly for shareholder si. However, the impact of limited liability on contracts and
on payo¤s obtained by the partnership (si;mj) di¤ers depending on the level of managers
reservation utility U j. For low values of U j, the optimal payment scheme depends only on
the value of the project (Ri). The shareholder shares half of the value in case of success
and the manager ends up with a utility larger than U j. For large values of U j, the optimal
payment scheme also depends on U j as the participation constraint binds. The threshold,
denoted by bUij, that divides both regions depends on the value of the project and on the
distribution of the market specic component as well as on the e¢ ciency of the manager.
Formally, bUij = R2i
cj
(h)
8
:
Finally, note that the shareholder si will not nd acceptable a contract with the manager
mj if she obtains negative earnings. This situation arises for U j > eUij  R2icj (h)2 . We
8As we will see, the optimal IS contract when shareholder si has to ensure manager mj at least U j
can give him a level of utility higher than U j (due to the limited liability constraint). That is, U j might
not be the actual managers utility in a stable outcome. However, we compute the optimal shareholders
contract for any possible U j as it is the most direct way to develop our analysis.
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summarize these ndings and identify the contract W ISsi;mj(U j) in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 If (si;mj) sign an IS contract W ISsi;mj(U j) in a stable outcome for the
market fS;M;R; cg, then:
(a) U j  eUij and the managers expected utility is Uj = maxnbUij; U jo ;
(b) transfers under W ISsi;mj(U j) are w0 = 0 and wR =
q
2cjUj
(h)
;
(c) managers e¤ort as a function of h is eIS(h) = h
q
2Uj
cj(h)
;
(d) shareholders expected prots are si(W
IS
si;mj
(U j)) = Ri
q
2(h)Uj
cj
  2Uj:
Figure 1 depicts shareholder sis prots as a function of manager mjs reservation
utility U j. For any U j in the interval
h
0; bUij, the optimal contract is the same. It provides
the manager an expected utility level of bUij (i.e., he obtains information rentsdue to
the limited liability constraint). When U j 2
hbUij; eUiji ; the e¢ ciency of the (contingent)
managers e¤ort increases with U j since the shareholder provides the required higher
utility by increasing the salary in case of success (and keeping w0 = 0). Intuitively, prots
increase with the value of the project (Ri) and with the managers e¢ ciency (the inverse
of cj). Finally, better market opportunities, summarized by (h), increase prots.
Figure 1: Shareholders prots under Incentive contracts.
Under a CBP contract WCBPsi;mj (U j), shareholder and manager not only agree on the
payment scheme but also on a pre-specied level of e¤ort. Since the e¤ort is contractual,
the only objective of the payment scheme is that the manager accepts to enter into the
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relationship. Furthermore, given that both shareholder and manager are risk neutral
agents, only the expected wage matters. For the sake of simplicity, and without loss of
generality, we stick to xed wages. Proposition 3 summarizes the characteristics of the
contract when the Code is adopted:
Proposition 3 If (si;mj) sign a CBP contract WCBPsi;mj (U j) in a stable outcome for the
market fS;M;R; cg, then:
(a) managers e¤ort under WCBPsi;mj (U j) is e
CBP = Ri
cj
(h);
(b) transfers are wR = w0 = U j +
R2i
cj
(h)2
2
;
(c) U j  R
2
i
cj
(h)2
2
and the manager obtains a utility of U j;
(d) shareholders expected prots are si(W
CBP
si;mj
(U j)) =
R2i
cj
(h)2
2
  U j:
The optimal ex-ante level of e¤ort that maximizes shareholders prots depends on the
value of the project Ri, the managers e¢ ciency (the inverse of cj) and also on (h): the
average value of the market conditions. Since managers e¤ort must be ex-ante selected
and the shareholder does not know the true market conditions, the optimal level of e¤ort
is taken as if the true realization was in fact the mean of the distribution (because this is
the choice that minimizes the potential losses from an ex-post deviation/mistake). Due
to the adoption of the Code, the shareholder does not need to pay informational rents.
Once we have studied the characteristics of W ISsi;mj(U j) and W
CBP
si;mj
(U j), we proceed to
analyze whether shareholder si prefers to propose an IS contract or a CBP contract as a
function of U j. The main advantage of implementing a Code versus providing incentives
is that the former allows a better control of the managers actions. Yet, since the market-
specic component h is not veriable, adopting a Code causes a loss in exibility (ex-post)
in the managers decision taking. Proposition 4 characterizes the optimal contract.9
Proposition 4 Shareholder si obtains higher prots with the contract WCBPsi;mj (U j) than
with W ISsi;mj(U j) if and only if V ar(h)  (h)2 and U j < Uij, where
Uij  R
2
i
cj
hp
(h) 
p
(h) (h)2
i2
2
if V ar(h)  1
3
(h)2; and
Uij  R
2
i
2cj
h
(h)2   (h)
2
i
if V ar(h) 2 (1
3
(h)2; (h)2).
9We take the convention that the IS contract will be selected in case of indi¤erence between the two
contracts.
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Proposition 4 states the conditions for the optimal contract to include a Code of Best
Practice. Note that a CBP is never adopted if V ar(h)  (h)2. In a nutshell, adopting
a CBP requires an environment with low enough variance (V ar(h)  (h)2) and a low
managers utility level (U j < U

ij). Intuitively, a CBP becomes very e¤ective in situations
where the environment is not too volatile since the pre-specied level of e¤ort (the optimal
corresponding to a situation around the mean of the distribution) does not di¤er too much
from the optimal ex-post e¤ort. On the other hand, the IS contract allows the manager
to adapt better to current circumstances, which also benets the shareholder (although
the managers decisions will not be optimal). Besides, the Code allows the shareholder to
control better the manager which, in turn, implies a lower wage expected cost. This latter
e¤ect is less relevant when the managers utility is large as, in this case, it is cheaper to
give the proper incentives to the manager also ex-post. In fact, managers e¤ort increases
with the minimum utility and towards the rst best level of e¤ort (Proposition 2), while
the e¤ort is independent of U j when a CBP is adopted (Proposition 3). Hence, a CBP
is more useful when managers reservation utility is not too large. Figure 2 illustrates
the e¤ect of managers utility on the adoption decision when the environment is not too
volatile.
Figure 2: The adoption decision under
environments with low variance (V ar(h) < 1
3
2(h))
The adoption of a CBP also depends on the ratio Ri=cj, that is, on the value of the
project and on managers e¢ ciency. The higher this ratio, the higher the e¤ort that will
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be asked from the manager; given the more acute agency problem, the shareholder si nds
the CBP more appealing as it allows better managers control. This result is true unless
the partnership copes with a very volatile environment.
4 Stable outcomes in the shareholder-manager mar-
ket
In this Section, we analyze stable outcomes in the market formed by shareholders and
managers. The main objectives are to highlight the e¤ect of competition for managers on
the contracts signed by rms and to state the composition of the rms: who is matched
with whom. We rst prove, in Proposition 5, that stable outcomes always exist.
Proposition 5 The set of stable outcomes in the market fS;M;R; cg is always non-
empty.
We prove this existence result in the Appendix by adapting to our environment the
proof developed by Crawford and Knoer (1981) for assignment games.10 In this proof we
rst show, as they did, that a stable outcome always exists in any discrete economy
where the possible levels of reservation utility of the managers are discrete, di¤ering by
a (possible very small) amount. We then prove that, if the market fS;M;R; cg has no
stable outcome, then also a discrete economy with levels of minimum utility close enough
can not have a stable outcome.
An alternative way to prove existence is to propose an outcome for the market and
show that it is indeed stable. Since this approach may help to understand how stable
outcomes look like, we now develop such a constructive method when there are either two
or three partners in each side.
Consider an economy with two shareholders and two managers where forming part-
nerships is always protable, that is s2(m2;Ws2;m2(U))  0. Image a ctitious auction
between the two shareholders to hire the best manager. We denote by U
sim1 , for i = 1; 2,
10See also Gale (1984), Demange and Gale (1985) and Sotomayor (2002) for existence results in assign-
ment games. The main di¤erence between our model and the assignment game is that in ours, matched
agents agree on contingent payments and, possibly, on e¤ort, an not only on a xed monetary transfer.
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the maximum utility level for manager m1 that makes shareholder si indi¤erent between
hiring m1 with a reservation utility of U
sim1 and hiring m2 with the outside utility U :
si
 
Wsi;m1(U
sim1
)

= si (Wsi;m2(U)) :
We can interpret U
sim1 as the bid of si for m1. It is easy to check that if manager
s1 is ready to pay more than s2 to hire the better manager, i.e., U
s1m1  U s2m1, then
the matching ((s1;m1) ; (s2;m2)) together with the contracts
 
Ws1;m1(U
s1m1
);Ws2;m2(U)

,
form a stable outcome. The other case is similar. Remark also that we can easily extend
the argument to markets with more than two shareholders or more than two managers.
When there are three shareholders and three managers, we need to proceed in several
steps. In the rst step, we denote by U
simj
1 , for i = 1; 2; 3 and j = 1; 2, where the subindex
refer to step 1,the bid of si for mj against m3, that is, the maximum utility level such
that:
si
 
Wsi;mj(U
simj
1 )

= si (Wsi;m3(U)) ;
and we dene U
sim3
1 = U , for all i. Also, we denote by S(mj)1 the set of shareholders whose
bid for mj is the highest, i.e., S(mj)1 =

si=U
simj
1  U
skmj
1 for all k
	
(note that, by our
convention, S(m3)1 = fs1; s2; s3g): If there exists a matching  such that (mj) 2 S(mj)1
for all j, we take . The matching  with the contractsW(mj);mj(U
(mj)mj
1 ) for j = 1; 2; 3;
form a stable outcome. If we can not associate a shareholder to each manager, we need
a second step. We take the unique shareholder s whose bid is the highest for both m1
and m2 : s = S(m1)1 = S(m2)1. We decrease simultaneously U
sm1
1 and U
sm2
1 ; keeping the
property that s obtains the same prots with both managers, until one of them reaches the
second highest bid. We denote such bids as U
sm1
2 and U
sm2
2 . We denote all the unchanged
bids as U
simj
2 instead of U
simj
1 and we dene S(mj)2 as before, for the new bids. Now,
there exists a matching  such that (mj) 2 S(mj)2 for all j (as S(m3)2 includes three
shareholders and another of the sets includes at least two shareholders). We claim that 
with the contracts W(mj);mj(U
(mj)mj
2 ) for j = 1; 2; 3; form a stable outcome.
Once we know that stable outcomes always exist in our market, we discuss in the
rest of the section their characteristics under several scenarios. First, we deal with the
cases where all the agents in one of the two sides are homogeneous, i.e., either all the
shareholders hold the same type of project or all the managers are equally e¢ cient. Even
in these two simple scenarios, there are interesting results concerning which partnerships
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are more prone to introduce CBPs and the utility level the managers achieve. We then
provide properties of the stable outcomes in environments where both sides of the market
are formed by heterogeneous agents.
4.1 Homogeneous shareholders and heterogeneous managers
Consider the case where the project in hands of all the shareholders o¤ers identical returns,
i.e., Ri = R for all i = 1; :::; n while managers di¤er in their ability, c1 < c2 < ::: < cN .
Also for simplicity, we are denoting sN the less e¢ cient manager with whom a shareholder
makes non-negative prots (if there are other managers in the market, we can discard them
as they will never be matched in a stable outcome).
Proposition 6 characterizes the stable outcomes in such a market. In the proposition,
we denote by ~n = min fn;Ng the number of rms that will be formed. Also, to identify
the threshold levels that will separate regions in the proposition, we use the following
notation: if V ar(h) < (h)2; we denote by j = s
 
Ws;mj(U

j )

the level of prots that
the shareholder obtains when manager mjs utility is such that she is indi¤erent between
a CBP contract and an IS contract.11 It is easy to check that j increases with the
managers e¢ ciency, hence it is decreasing in j.
Proposition 6 When shareholders are homogeneous and managers are heterogeneous,
properties (a) - (d) characterize an stable outcome (;W) for the market fS;M;R; cg:
(a) all shareholders have the same prot level ;
(b)  = 0 if n > N ;   s (Ws;mN (U)) if n = N ; and  2

s
 
Ws;mn+1(U)

; s (Ws;mn(U))

if n < N ;
(c) Ws;mj is the optimal contract for the manager that gives prots  to the shareholder.
In particular,
(d1) all are IS contracts if V ar(h)  (h)2 or if V ar(h) < (h)2 and   ~n;
(d2) all are CBP contracts if V ar(h) < (h)2 and  > 1;
(d3) Ws;mj is a CBP contract if j > J and Ws;mj is an IS contract if j  J , when
V ar(h) < (h)2 and J is such that J   > J+1.
Since all shareholders hold projects with the same return, the rst characteristic high-
lighted in Proposition 6 is that their prots must be equal. If this was not the case,
11For notational convenience, we denote Uj instead of U

ij , since shareholders are homogeneous.
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shareholder si getting lower prots than si0 could attract manager (si0) by proposing
a contract that slightly increases his utility. Second, the level of prots depends on the
strength of the competition for managers. Shareholders achieve positive prots when
competition for managers is smooth, that is, they are in the short side of the market.
Furthermore, their prots are higher when they could hire better managers with lower
outside option who are not hired in this market. Third, since CBPs allow better man-
agers control, they arise if competition between shareholders is not very strong (so that
managerslevel of utility is low), while shareholders are more prone to o¤er incentive con-
tracts in situations where competition is tough. Also, similar to the conclusion that we
obtained in the analysis for an isolated rm (Proposition 4), CBPs tend to be adopted in
environments with low variance, while IS contracts are signed under volatile environments.
Finally, Proposition 6 (d3) states who adopts a CBP when a market sustains simulta-
neously IS and CBP contracts: e¢ cient managers end up being hired through IS contracts
while a CBP is used to attract ine¢ cient ones. This contrasts with the conclusion ob-
tained after Proposition 4 suggesting that a CBP would be adopted for e¢ cient managers.
Proposition 6 (d3) shows that, when shareholders compete for the best managers, the con-
clusion is reversed. To attract e¢ cient managers, shareholders o¤er them a high utility
level and this now makes IS contracts more appealing than CBP contracts. This result
stresses the relevance of the study of manager-shareholder relationships in a framework
where not only contracts but also matching is endogenous.12
4.2 Heterogeneous shareholders and homogeneous managers
We now consider an economy formed by heterogeneous shareholders (Ri > Ri0 for all
i < i0) and equally e¢ cient managers (cj = c for all mj 2M). We assume, for simplicity,
that there are more managers than shareholders, i.e., N > n and that the partnership
between sn and a manager is feasible. A direct implication of the above is that the
reservation utility shareholders will need to provide to managers is the outside utility
U .13
12Similar to Barros and Macho-Stadler (1998) and Dam and Pérez-Castrillo (2006), the use of incentive
contracts has also a positive e¤ect on rms e¢ ciency. The better the manager, the closest the e¤ort to
its e¢ cient (rst-best) level.
13If N  n, managers will usually end up with a higher utility than U but the qualitative results will
hold.
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Proposition 7 characterizes the unique stable outcome for this market (for notational
simplicity, we denote Ui instead of U

ij).
Proposition 7 When shareholders are heterogeneous and managers are homogeneous,
properties (a) and (b) characterize the unique stable outcome (;W) for the market
fS;M;R; cg:
(a) (si) 2M for all si 2 S;
(b) all the contracts are Wsi;m = Wsi;m(U).
In particular,
(c1) all are IS contracts if V ar(h)  (h)2 or U  U1 ;
(c2) all are CBP contracts if V ar(h) < (h)2 and U < Un;
(c3) Wsi;m is a CBP contract if i  I and Wsi;m is an IS contract if i > I if V ar(h) <
(h)2 and UI+1  U < UI .
Proposition 7 establishes three di¤erent cases. Case (c1) identies environments where
stable outcomes only involve IS contracts. This situation takes place in volatile markets
or when managersopportunity cost (U) is very high. Case (c2) considers environments
with low variance and low (outside) cost for hiring managers, where all the contracts
include a CBP.
Case (c3) characterizes the circumstances under which both types of contracts coex-
ist. The adoption decision in this framework is similar to the case of an isolated rm:
shareholders owning good projects prefer to adopt a CBP, saving on incentive costs; their
managers receive no informational rents. On the other hand, shareholders with low-income
projects prefer to o¤er incentive contracts.
Interestingly enough, when the environment is volatile (V ar(h) > 1
3
(h)2 but still
V ar(h) < (h)2) the choice of the governance relationship adds an interesting e¤ect
on managers utility. Although managers are ex-ante homogeneous, their utilities are
di¤erent due to the two e¤ects: (i) shareholdersheterogeneity among those o¤ering IS
contracts, and (ii) the choice of the type of contract. In this scenario, a shareholder si
hires a manager through an IS contract by paying him bUi (see Proposition 2). Therefore,
the better the shareholder (i.e., the higher the value of the project), the larger the actual
utility that her manager obtains (since bUi is increasing in Ri). However, managers hired
by the best shareholders (the ones adopting a CBP) are worse o¤ relative to managers
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employed by shareholders owning less protable projects (through IS contracts). Corollary
1 summarizes this nding.
Corollary 1 Under the conditions set in part (c3) of Proposition 7, when V ar(h) >
1
3
(h)2, managersutility is not monotonic with respect to the value of the project in the
unique stable outcome for the market fS;M;R; cg: it is increasing as long as the manager
signs an IS contract and it sets down to the outside utility U as soon as he signs a CBP
contract.
Figure 3 illustrates the utility obtained in the stable outcome when some managers
are hired through IS contracts (grey dots) and the rest is hired under CBP contracts
(black dots). Note that managers hired under a CBP would be strictly better o¤ under
an incentive contract (white dots represents this last e¤ect).
iR
iU
U
nR 1R1-IRIR
iU?
2R1-nR
1
?
-iU
IU?
1
?
-IU
1
?U
2
?U
contractIncentive contractCBP
Figure 3: Managersutility depending on the
value of the project.
4.3 Heterogeneous shareholders and heterogeneous managers
We now analyze stable outcomes in markets where both shareholders and managers are
heterogeneous. We rst state a proposition that provides interesting information about
the level of utility obtained by di¤erent managers. We have seen that homogeneous
managers can end up with di¤erent utility levels. However, a general property allows
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to rank the level of managersutility as a function of their ability: when shareholders
compete for managers, better managers always obtain larger utility.
Proposition 8 The more e¢ cient the (matched) manager, the larger his expected utility
in a stable outcome for the market fS;M;R; cg.
The main question about the shape of matchings in stable outcomes is whether share-
holders with good projects end up hiring e¢ cient managers. If this is a characteristic of
the matchings, we say they are positively assortative.
Denition 7 A matching  for the market fS;M;R; cg is positively assortative if
shareholders with high-revenue projects are matched with e¢ cient managers, i.e., Ri > Ri0
implies that cj  cj0, where (si) = mj and (si0) = mj0.
Proposition 9 shows that stable outcomes do indeed always involve positively assorta-
tive matchings if all the participants in the market nd it optimal to use the same type
of contract.
Proposition 9 If (;W) is a stable outcome for the market fS;M;R; cg, then  is
positively assortative if the contracts in W are all IS contracts, or they are all CBP
contracts.
If, for instance, all participants were hiring managers through a CBP contract, then a
negative assortative contract could not be stable. The rationale is based on the fact that it
is optimal (in terms of total surplus) that the best managers run the best projects, hence
any negative assortative matching will be blocked by at least one alternative shareholder-
manager partnership creating more value for them.
However, the matching is not necessarily positively assortative when both types of
contracts coexist in a stable outcome. In that case, how does a non-positively assortative
matching in a stable outcome look like? Proposition 10 provides useful information in
that respect.
Proposition 10 If (;W) is a stable outcome for the market fS;M;R; cg and if (si) =
mj and (si0) = mj0 with Ri > Ri0 and cj > cj0, then si and mj sign a CBP contract while
si0 and mj0 sign an IS contract.
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Therefore, in a non-positively assortative matching in a stable outcome, sharehold-
ers with protable projects hire low-ability managers through CBPs while high-ability
managers sign incentive contracts in less protable rms. This is due to the following
trade-o¤. On the one hand, maximizing total surplus requires a positively assortative
matching. Hence, stable outcomes tend to be possitively assortative. On the other hand,
the better the shareholder, the more likely that she prefers proposing a CBP contract.
Therefore, it can be the case that, say, shareholder s2s best contract to attract manager
m1 is an IS contract giving him a rent not lower than bU21 while a shareholder with a more
protable project, s1, would prefer to hire this manager through a CBP. If s1 is forced
to pay m1 the rent that s2 is ready to o¤er, then she would rather attract a less e¢ cient
manager through a CBP, as long as the di¤erence in e¢ ciency between the two managers
and in the value of the two projects is not too large.
To gain intuition about why a negatively assortative matching can be stable, consider
a situation similar to the one displayed in Figure 3, except that now m1 is slightly more
e¢ cient than the rest of the managers, c1 < c. The white dots in Figure 4 represent the
maximum utility U
i1
shareholder si for i  I, is ready to pay to match with m1 (we know
that she will do it through an IS contract). If shareholder s1 wants to hire m1, she has to
o¤er him at least U
I1
. Given the preference of s1 to o¤er a CBP, she will prefer keeping
a normalmanager at the prize U instead of attracting the slightly better manager at
the prize U
I1
.
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Figure 4: managersutility when only two
types of managers exists
5 Introducing Codes: Welfare Considerations
Does the introduction of CBPs yield a welfare improvement? To answer this question, we
compare an initial situation where only IS contracts exist (i.e., CBPs are not allowed or
they do not exist) with a nal situation where both CBP and IS contracts are permitted.
As we have stressed, CBPs are voluntary mechanisms; shareholders only adopt them if
they earn higher prots, given the managersreservation utilities. Therefore, a welfare
improvement would be expected as a reasonable outcome. However, this shall not always
be the case due to three e¤ects. First, the CBP allows a shareholder to avoid paying
informational rents in those cases where an IS contract would ensure the manager a
level of utility higher than his reservation utility. Therefore, even if welfare (shareholders
expected prots plus managers expected utility) decreases, the shareholder may be willing
to adopt the CBP. Second, the introduction of CBP contracts may have an e¤ect on the
managersoutside utility level. Finally, the introduction of CBPs may have a deep e¤ect
on the market structure; a negative assortative matching may arise.
We claim that the introduction of CBPs is likely to enhance welfare in environments
with low variance while it has negative consequences for welfare in environments with
intermediate variance. We do not need to discuss those environments with high variance
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since the rms that opperate in them will never adopt CBPs, hence its introduction will
be without consequence in these industries. We briey make a case for our claim.
First, we show that if the introduction of CBPs does not afect the managerslevel of
utility and the composition of the matching, voluntary CBPs enhance welfare in markets
with low volatility but they have a negative impact in markets with intermediate volatility.
Indeed, the welfare obtained by each protable partnership depending on the governance
mechanism is:
WCBPij =
(h)2
2
R2i
cj
and WISij =
8<:
3(h)
8
R2i
cj
if U j < bUij
Ri
q
2(h)Uj
cj
  U j if U j  bUij .
We can easily check that, when U j < bUij, WCBPij  WISij if and only if the variance is
low (V ar(h)  (h)2). Also when Uj  bUij, if the optimal contract includes a CBP,
i.e, if Uj < Uij, then this decision decreases welfare if the environment has intermediate
variance.14 Therefore, the claim holds, for example, in markets with many managers of
similar ability since the introduction of CBPs will modify neither the expected utility of
the managers nor the nature of the matching.
Second, we discuss situations where the introduction of voluntary CBPs may a¤ect the
managersutility. We argue that the previous claim often holds, although some new e¤ects
make CBPs less appealing from a welfare point of view. To discuss a situation where the
introduction of CBPs does not change the matching (it remains possitively assortative)
but it modies managersreservation utility, let us focus on a market with one good
manager and many identical standardmanagers. The e¤ect of the CBPs in the rms
involving standard managers is the same as before: good for welfare if low variance and
bad if intermediate variance. This is also the e¤ect in the rm where the good manager is
hired if it adopts a CBP, as the welfare is in this case independent on the managers utility.
However, this is not necessarily true if this rm uses an IS contract. The introduction of
CBPs, in this case, relaxes competition for managers between shareholders. Given that
the other rms can now adopt CBPs, they may make higher prots with their standard
managers. Therefore, hiring the good manager through an IS contract might be less
appealing. The (equilibrium) reservation utility of the good manager may decrease if
CBPs can be adopted, which would imply a lower welfare in the rm where he is working.
14With intermediate variance, it is always the case that Uij < bUij .
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A third e¤ect is due to the fact that the matching may not longer be possitively
assortative if IS and CBP contracts coexist. This e¤ect is also typically detrimental for
welfare, as a possitively assortative matching is optimal from a total surplus point of view.
Therefore, we can conclude that, in our model, the introduction of voluntary CBPs
decreases welfare in environments with intermediate volatility. On the other hand, it
certainly increases welfare in environments with low volatility as long as it does not
induce too many changes in the structure of the market, either through drastic decreases
in managerslevel of utility or through changes in the equilibrium allocation of managers
to rms.
6 Conclusion and Extensions
This paper has explored the way competition a¤ects shareholderswillingness to adopt
Codes of Best Practice. We have modeled a Code as a monitoring mechanism that allows
shareholders to control ex-ante managersdecisions. Adopting the Code, though, impedes
a exible managersreaction to changing market conditions.
Due to ex-post inexibility, CBPs tend to be adopted in environments where predicting
market conditions is not a complex task for shareholders. More mature industries, such as
utilities, banking, food and drink sector, should be, according to our predictions, examples
of industries where CBPs are more likely to be adopted. On the contrary, when the
environment faces high volatility, the best a shareholder can opt for is to leave managers
hands free (i.e., to o¤er him an incentive contract). High-tech sectors such as dot-com
industries, or pharmaceutical companies should tend to use incentive contracts, letting
the manager take the major decisions.
Our ndings suggest that the characteristics of the set of shareholders and the set
of managers in the market have a deep e¤ect on the decision of adopting a CBP. When
shareholders have similar projects, i.e., rmstechnologies are similar, the CBPs do not
seem to be the right mechanisms to attract the best managers. Indeed, partnerships will
agree on this governance structure only in environments with low level of competition
for managers. In addition, when both types of governance structures coexist, the lower
the managers ability, the more likely that a Code is adopted. Instead, when managers
are of similar ability, the shareholders with best projects prefer to adopt the Code since
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this governance pattern allows a shareholder to reduce her managers rents. In fact,
our analysis suggests that the best shareholders might be willing to renounce to hire
the best managers, who would be o¤ered incentive contracts, and hire instead lower
ability managers through CBPs. Hence, although the matching between shareholders and
managers is always positively assortative when only one type of governance structure exists
in the market, the property may fail to hold due to the coexistence of both governance
structures.
Since the characteristics of the market are linked to the type of industry a rm operates
in and to the type of project, it seems natural to ask how the conclusions of our analysis
would be a¤ected if shareholdersheterogeneity was not due to the value of their project
but to the distribution function of the market specic characteristics (that is, we would
have a distribution function Fi(h) for each shareholder i). Similar to the conclusions
obtained when heterogeneity is due to the value of the project, also here the matching
is positively assortativewhen all the rms end up under the same type of governance
structure. However, the meaning of positively assortative depends now on the type
of governance. If all contracts include a Code, then the best managers are hired by
those shareholders whose market-specic component has a higher mean. However, if
they are all incentive contracts, the bestshareholders are those in markets where the
combination of mean and variance (expressed in the variable i(h)) is higher; these are the
shareholders who end up forming rms with the higher-ability managers. Also, we have
some information about how a non-positively assortative matching in a stable outcome
looks like. For example, if all shareholders own projects in markets whose shocks have
the same average then, in a non-positively assortative matching, shareholders in markets
with higher volatility hire low-ability managers through incentive contracts while high-
ability managers sign contracts including a Code in rms producing in markets with lower
variance.
Finally, we have not considered the possibility that rms, once created, could compete
against each other in the product market. In our model, there was competition among
shareholders to catch the best managers and among managers to work for the shareholders
that o¤er the best contracts, but there was no competition among rms. A rms prots
were independent of the composition of the other rms. Extending our model to explicitly
allow rmsmarket competition seems computationally demanding. However, the analysis
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developed so far provides enough elements to be able to anticipate the e¤ects of rms
competition on the use of Codes of Best Practices.
For our purposes, rmsmarket competition should have two main implications. First,
it makes the best managers even more appealing than before as shareholders will be ready
to o¤er good salaries to these managers not only because of their value for the rm but also
to avoid that they are hired by the market competitors. According to our results, such an
increase in managersutility should favour the use of incentive contracts. Second, market
competition typically allows improving incentive contracts by making use of yardstick
contracts, where a manager is paid according not only to his absolute performance, but
also as a function of his relative performance with respect to others. Both e¤ects go in
the direction of making incentive contracts more appealing. Therefore, we should expect
to observe less use of Codes in those markets characterized by tough competition.
7 Appendix
Proof. of Proposition 1. Assume (;W) is stable, but the contract Wsi;mj 2 W signed
by (si;mj), where (si) = mj, is not constrained Pareto optimal. (a) First, suppose
there exists a feasible contract W 0 for the partnership (si;mj) such that si(mj;W
0) >
si((si);Wsi;(si)) and Vmj(si;W
0) > V ((mj);Wmj ;(mj)). In that case, (si;mj) will
block (;W) with W 0. This contradicts the initial fact that (;W) is stable.
(b) Second, suppose there exists a feasible contract W 0 for the partnership (si;mj) such
that si(mj;W
0) > si((si);Wsi;(si)) and Vmj(si;W
0) = V ((mj);Wmj ;(mj)). Consider
the contract W" that includes both salaries higher that W 0 by  > 0. Managers e¤ort
will be the same under W" and W 0 (if these contract include a CBP this will happen by
contract; if they are incentive contracts, the ICC does not change). If  is small enough,
W" satises si(mj;W") > si((si);Wsi;(si)) and Vmj(si;W") > V ((mj);Wmj ;(mj));
which we already know contradicts the stability of (;W).
The analysis of the third possibility requires a more detailed understanding of the
(optimal) contracts between shareholder and manager. We will develop such an analysis
in the rest of Section 3 using (b), i.e., there can not exist a contract that leaves the
manager indi¤erent by improves shareholders prots. We can check afterwards that,
among those contracts, it is not possible to improve managers expected utility without
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lowering strictly shareholders prots.
Proof. of Proposition 2. The contract W ISsi;mj(U j) is the solution to the following
programme:
max
fwR;w0;eg
hZ
h
fhe(wR; w0;h) [Ri   wR]  [1  he(wR; w0;h)]w0g dF (h)
s.t. (ICC),(LLR), (LL0), and
hZ
h

he(wR; w0;h)wR + [1  he(wR; w0;h)]w0   cj e(wR; w0;h)
2
2

dF (h)  U j:
We can rewrite the programme by plugging (ICC) into the objective function and the
last constraint. After some calculations we obtain:
max
fwR;w0g

 w0 + (h)
cj
(wR   w0)(Ri   (wR   w0))

s.t. w0 +
(h)
2cj
(wR   w0)2  U j (1)
w0  0: (2)
where we have omitted (LLR) since it is implied by (ICC) and (2).
Let  and  be the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to (1) and (2), respectively.
The Kuhn-Tucker (rst-order) conditions of the above maximization problem are (1), (2),
  0,   0, and:
(h)
cj
(Ri   2(wR   w0)) + (h)
cj
(wR   w0) = 0 (3)
 1  (h)
cj
(Ri   2(wR   w0)) +   (h)
cj
(wR   w0) +  = 0 (4)


w0 +
(h)
2cj
(wR   w0)2   U j

= 0 (5)
w0 = 0: (6)
First, simplifying (3) we get:
 = 2  Ri
(wR   w0) (7)
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and plugging (7) into (4) we obtain:
 =  1 + Ri
(wR   w0) : (8)
We study the di¤erent regions where Kuhn-Tucker conditions may be satised:
Case 1:  > 0,  > 0 (Both (1) and (2) are binding). Payment in case of failure is w0 = 0
following (1) while in case of success is wR =
q
2Ujcj
(h)
from (2). Finally, from (7) and (8)
this is possible only if U j 2

R2i
cj
(h)
8
;
R2i
cj
(h)
2

:
Case 2:  =  = 0. (3) implies Ri = 2(wR   w0) and plugging this into (4) we get
 1 = 0, which is not possible.
Case 3:  > 0;  = 0 ((1) is binding). From (8) we get wR   w0 = Ri. This implies
that  = 1. Then, (1) implies w0 = U j   R
2
i
cj
(h)
2
. Since w0  0, this case is only possible
if U j  R
2
i
cj
(h)
2
.
Case 4:  = 0;  > 0 ((2) is binding). From (2) we obtain w0 = 0, and using (7), we
get wR = Ri2 . This implies, by (8),  = 1. In this case (1) holds only if U j 
R2i
cj
(h)
8
.
If U j >
R2i
cj
(h)
2
, the optimum must lie in Case 3 and si =  w0 < 0 which is not
feasible. If U j <
R2i
cj
(h)
8
, the optimum lies in Case 4, where Uj =
R2i
cj
(h)
8
and shareholders
prots are the same as if U j =
R2i
cj
(h)
8
. These facts prove part (a) in Proposition 2.
Also, it is easily checked that the solution at the borders of cases 3 and 4 coincide with
the solution at the borders of Case 1 (the solution is continuous). Therefore, the optimal
contract has the shape found in Case 1, which proves part (b). Finally, parts (c) and (d)
follow from the contracts in Case 1.
Proof. of Proposition 3. First, since there is no need to give the manager incentives,
a xed wage is optimal, we denote it by w (= wR = w0). The contract WCBPsi;mj (U j) is the
solution to the following problem:
max
fe;wg
hZ
h
heRidF (h)  w = (h)eRi   w
s.t. w   cj e
2
2
 U j (9)
w  0: (10)
From (9), w  cj e22 +U j which implies that (10) is not binding. Also, since w a¤ects nega-
tively shareholder sis expected prots, (9) is binding. This proves part (c) of Proposition
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3. Therefore, shareholders problem is:
eCBP 2 argmax
e
f(h)eRi   cj e
2
2
g;
hence, eCBP = Ri
cj
(h). This shows part (a). Part (b) is obtained by plugging eCBP into
(9) binding. Finally, to prove part (d), we substitute eCBP and the optimal wage into
shareholder sis expected prots.
Proof. of Proposition 4. We compare the prot functions of propositions 2 and 3.
First, we compare both prot functions at the extreme values U j = 0 and eUij:
si(W
CBP
si;mj
(0))  si(W ISsi;mj(0))()
R2i
cj
(h)2
2
 R
2
i
cj
(h)
4
()
(h)2  1
2
(h)() V ar(h)  (h)2.
si(W
CBP
si;mj
(eUij)) = R2i
cj
(h)2
2
  R
2
i
cj
(h)
2
< 0 = si(W
IS
si;mj
(eUij)),
where the inequality holds since V ar(h) = (h) (h)2 > 0. Moreover, @

si (W
CBP
si;mj
(Uj))

@Uj
=
 1, @

si (W
IS
si;mj
(Uj))

@Uj
= 0 for U j  bUij; and si(W ISsi;mj(U j)) is a decreasing and con-
cave function of U j for U j 2
hbUij; eUiji with @si (W ISsi;mj (Uj))@Uj = 0 for U j = bUij and
@

si (W
IS
si;mj
(Uj))

@Uj
=  1 for U j = eUij. Therefore, the functions si(WCBPsi;mj (U j)) and
si(W
IS
si;mj
(U j)) cross at most once in
h
0; eUiji :
The previous properties imply rst, that si(W
CBP
si;mj
(U j))  si(W ISsi;mj(U j)) for all
U j if V ar(h)  (h)2: Second, note that si(W ISsi;mj(U j)) =
R2i
cj
(h)
4
for all U j  bUij and
si(W
CBP
si;mj
(U j)) is strictly decreasing w.r.t. U j. We evaluate prots at bUij and we obtain
si(W
CBP
si;mj
(bUij))  si(W ISsi;mj(bUij))() R2icj (h)
2
2
  R
2
i
cj
(h)
8
 R
2
i
cj
(h)
4
() (h)2  3
4
(h)() V ar(h)  1
3
(h)2.
Therefore, if V ar(h) 2 1
3
(h)2; (h)2

the Code is adopted if and only if U j < U

j ,
where Uj 2
h
0; bUiji is implicitly dened by si(WCBPsi;mj (Uj )) = si(W ISsi;mj(Uj )), i.e., Uij =
R2i
2cj
h
(h)2   (h)
2
i
:
Finally, if V ar(h) 2  0; 1
3
(h)2

; we have si(W
CBP
si;mj
(bUij)) > si(W ISsi;mj(bUij)) and
si(W
CBP
si;mj
(eUij)) < si(W ISsi;mj(eUij)): By the properties of the derivatives of the prot
functions, there exists a unique Uij 2 (bUij; eUij) such that the Code is adopted if U j < Uij.
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Level Uij is the smaller of the two values for which si(W
CBP
si;mj
(Uj )) = si(W
IS
si;mj
(Uj )),
i.e., Ri
q
2(h)Uj
cj
  2Uij = R
2
i
cj
(h)2
2
  Uij. It corresponds to the expression stated in part
(a) of the Proposition.
Proof. of Proposition 5. We are going to adapt to our environment the proof
of existence developed by Crawford and Knoer (1981) for assignment games. We rst
consider a discrete economy, where the possible levels of reservation utility of the managers
are U , U +1, U +2, and so on. The numbers can be as small as wished, we denote U + r
instead of U + r for notational simplicity.
Given that the participation constraint in a contract Wsi;mj(U j) might not be binding
when the optimal contract is an IS contract, we denote asW+si;mj(U j) the optimal contract
when si is imposed only to select contracts that provide mj a nal utility of U + r, where
r must be some non-negative natural number.
We apply the following algorithm that denes the possible o¤ers by shareholders to
managers and the way they should act at any time t:
R1. U j(0) = U for all j 2 N .
R2. Each shareholder si makes an o¤er W+si;mk(Uk(0)) to the manager mk with whom she
obtains the largest non-negative prots, given the level of reservation utility U j(0) that
she must guaranty to any manager mj. That is, k 2 argmaxj2N
n
si

W+si;mj(U j(0))
o
.
R3. Each manager who receives one or more o¤ers, rejects all but his favorite, which he
tentatively accepts. Ties are broken at any time in any manner.
R4. O¤ers not rejected in previous periods remain in force. If managermj rejected an o¤er
from some shareholder in period t 1, then U j(t) = U j(t 1)+1; if not, U j(t) = U j(t 1).
Rejected shareholders continue to make o¤ers to their favorite managers, taking into
account the current permitted reservation utility levels, as long as they make non-negative
prots.
R5. The process stops when no rejections are issued in some period. Managers then
accept the o¤ers that remain in force from the shareholders they have not rejected.
Claim 1. After a nite number of periods, no rejections are issued, every manager gets
at most one o¤er, and the process stops.
This claim follows the fact that the increments in the minimum utility are discrete
and that a shareholders prots are negative if the reservation utility she needs to o¤er to
the manager is high enough.
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Claim 2. The process converges to a discrete stable allocation in the discrete market
previously dened.
By construction, the algorithm always provides individually-rational outcomes. Hence,
we prove that the nal allocation of the process is indeed discrete stable if we show that
it can not be blocked by a shareholder-manager pair. By Claim 1, the process converges
to an outcome, denote it by (;W). Suppose that (;W) is not discrete stable. Then,
there exists a couple (si;mj) such that
si(W
+
si;mj
(Uj + 1)) > i,
where Uj and i are, respectively, the utility and prots currently obtained by si and mj
under (;W) (remember that Uj = U + r, for some natural number r). We note that,
denoting by T the period where the process has stopped, Uj  U j(T ); in fact, Uj = U j(T )
if the nal contract signed bymj includes a CBP, but Uj can be strictly larger than U j(T )
ifmj signs an IS contract. However, we know that shareholder si has preferred (si) tomj
when the minimum utility level to o¤er tomj was, at most, U j(T )+1 (the utility level can
have been smaller at the time si made her decision, as she might have been provisionally
matched with (si) for some periods before T ). That is, si(W
+
si;mj
(U j(T ) + 1))  i.
Hence, (si;mj) can not block the outcome.
Claim 3. The market fS;M;R; cg has a stable outcome.
Suppose that fS;M;R; cg does not have a stable outcome. Take any individually
rational outcome (;W) where the contracts are constrained Pareto optimal. We denote
any such an outcome as (;U), where U = (U1; :::; UN) 2 RN is the vector of managers
utilities under (;U) (hence, W is the optimal vector of contracts for the shareholders
given the managers they are assigned to according to  and the managersutility levels
U). We denote by 	 the set of all matchings  for which there exists a vector U such that
(;U) is individually rational. Let:
b [(si;mj) ; (;U)]  si
 
Wsi;mj(Uj)
  si  Wsi;(si)(Uk) ;
where mk = (si); that is, b [(si;mj) ; (;U)] is the (possibly negative) extra benets that
si can obtain by deviating from (;U) with mj. Also, dene
B [(;U)]  max
(si;mj)
b [(si;mj) ; (;U)] :
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Given that (;U) does not have a stable outcome, B [(;U)] > 0 if (;U) is individually
rational. Moreover, b [(si;mj) ; (;U)] is a continuous function of U (prots are continuous
in the managers utility), hence B [(;U)] is also a continuous function of U . For any
 2 	, let
G()  min
(U1;:::;UN )
B [(;U)]
s.t. Uj  U for all j
(mj)
 
W(mj);mj(Uj)
  0 for all j;
and
H  min
2	
G():
The function G() is well dened for any  2 	: B [(;U)] is a continuous function and
the feasible set is non-empty and compact, hence, B [(;U)] reaches its minimum at some
feasible vector of utilities. Moreover, G() > 0 for all  2 	 since B [(;U)] > 0 for every
(;U) in the feasible region. Finally, H > 0 since 	 is a nite set.
Therefore, we have proven that there exists H > 0 such that, for any individually
rational outcome (;W) we can nd a pair (si;mj) whose benets by deviating are larger
than H. Note that we can always split the extra prots B obtained by the shareholder
between her and her manager by increasing both managers salaries by B=2; which does
not alter his incentives. Hence, if we choose the unit of measurement smaller than H=2;
this would imply that any individually rational allocation can be improved upon by a
least one partnership (si;mj) in the corresponding discrete market as well, which would
contradict Claim 2.
Proof of Proposition 6. We prove part (a) is necessary. Suppose, without loss
of generality, that shareholder s1 obtains lower prots than s2. Then, s1 could hire the
manager who is currently with s2, o¤er him a slightly better utility level than before
(through, say, the same type of contract than s2 was o¤ering) and make strictly higher
prots. This is not possible in a stable outcome. Part (b) easily follows from the maximum
and minimum prots that the shareholder hiring the worst manager (or not hiring at all)
can make. Part (c) follows after Proposition 1. Finally, it is immediate that if the
contracts satisfy (a) - (c), then the outcome is stable.
To prove part (d1), we note that if V ar(h)  (h)2, the CBP is never adopted
according to Proposition 4. If V ar(h) < (h)2 and   n, then   j for all managers,
33
since j is decreasing in j. This implies that Uj  Uj since the constrained Pareto optimal
contract between the shareholder and the manager mj that provides the shareholder a
prot level smaller or equal than j shall give mj higher utility level than U

j (which he
would obtain in the case the shareholder would get j). Therefore (Proposition 4), An
incentive contract is optimal for all j. A very similar argument allows to prove part (d2 ).
When V ar(h) < (h)2 and J is such that J   > J+1 then J   if and only if
j  J . As we have argued above, j   implies that the constrained Pareto optimal
contract between a shareholder and mj is an IS contract. In fact, Ws;mj is a IS contract
if and only if j > J , as stated in part (e) of the Proposition.
Proof. of Proposition 7. Given N > n and that managers are homogeneous, any
contract in any stable outcome should be the best contract for the shareholder when she
only needs to o¤er U to the manager. It is then immediate that (a) and (b) characterize
the (unique) stable outcome.
Parts (c1), (c2), and (c3) easily follow given the characteristics of the optimal contract
given in Proposition 4 and the fact that U1 > ::: > U

I 1 > U

I > ::: > U

n.
Proof of Corollary 1. Under the conditions set in part (c) of Proposition 1, a
manager matched with a badshareholder is hired through an IS contract, which implies
that he achieves bUi, whereas a manager matched with a good shareholder achieves
U < bUi through a CBP contract. Finally dbUidRi = Ri
hp
(h) 
p
(h) (h)2
i
c
> 0.
Proof. of Proposition 8. Let mj and mj0, with cj < cj0, be two managers that are
matched under the stable outcome (;W) and let Uj and Uj0 be the level of utility they
obtain. Suppose, by contradiction, that Uj  Uj0. By inspection of a shareholders prots
in Propositions 2 and 3, it is easily checked that they are increasing in managers e¢ ciency,
for a given level of managers utility. Therefore, if si0 = (mj0) o¤ers Wsi0 ;mj(Uj0) to
manager mj, she will obtain higher prots than in the outcome (;W) while mj achieves
the utility level Uj0  Uj. It is always possible to modify that contract to make sure
that both si0 and mj obtain higher prots than under (;W); that is, they can block the
outcome, which contradicts the fact that it is stable.
Proof of Propositions 9 and 10. We do the proof by contradiction. Take two
matched shareholders si and si0, with mj = (si) and mj0 = (si0), such that Ri > Ri0
while cj > cj0 : Denote by Uj and Uj0, with Uj < Uj0 according to Lemma 8, the level of
utility obtained by managers mj and mj0 in the stable outcome (;W). The contracts
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signed by shareholders si and si0 are, respectively, Wsi;mj(Uj) and Wsi0 ;mj0 (Uj0).
We are going to prove that unless Wsi;mj(Uj) = W
CBP
si;mj
(Uj) and Wsi0 ;mj0 (Uj0) =
W ISsi0 ;mj0 (Uj0); the following inequality hods:
si(Wsi;mj0 (Uj0)) + si0 (Wsi0 ;mj(Uj)) > si(Wsi;mj(Uj)) + si0 (Wsi0 ;mj0 (Uj0)): (11)
Therefore, either si(Wsi;mj0 (Uj0)) > si(Wsi;mj(Uj)) or si0 (Wsi0 ;mj(Uj)) > si0 (Wsi0 ;mj0 (Uj0)).
However, this cannot happen in a stable outcome. Indeed, suppose for instance that the
rst inequality was true. Shareholder si could o¤er to manager mj0 a contract that would
guaranty this manager an expected utility slightly larger than Uj0 while keeping for herself
expected prots larger than si(Wsi;mj(Uj)). That is, the partnership (si;mj0) could block
the outcome (;W).
We now prove inequality (11).
(a) Consider rst that both are IS contracts, i.e.,Wsi;mj(Uj) =W
IS
si;mj
(Uj) andWsi0 ;mj0 (Uj0) =
W ISsi0 ;mj0 (Uj0): From Proposition (2), the optimal payment has a di¤erent shape depending
on the level of utility. We know that Uj  bUij and Uj0  bUi0j0. This also implies that
Uj  bUi0j: We consider now two cases:
(a1) Uj0  bUij0. In this case, equation (11) is equivalent to:
Ri
s
2(h)Uj0
cj0
  2Uj0 +Ri0
s
2(h)Uj
cj
  2Uj > Ri
s
2(h)Uj
cj
  2Uj +Ri0
s
2(h)Uj0
cj0
  2Uj0,
which holds given that:
[Ri  Ri0 ]
"s
Uj0
cj0
 
s
Uj
cj
#
> 0:
(a2) Uj0 2 [bUi0j0 ; bUij0). In this case, si(W Isi;mj0 (bUij0)) = R2i (h)4cj0 and (11) is implied by:
R2i (h)
4cj0
+Ri0
s
2(h)Uj
cj
  2Uj > Ri
s
2(h)Uj
cj
  2Uj +Ri0
s
2(h)Uj0
cj0
  2Uj0 ;
which is equivalent to:
f(Ri; Ri0) =
R2i (h)
4cj0
 
 
Ri0
s
2(h)Uj0
cj0
  2Uj0
!
  (Ri  Ri0)
s
2(h)Uj
cj
> 0:
We see that @f(Ri;Ri0 )
@Ri
> 0 if and only if Uj < bUij0 cjcj0 , which always holds in this region.
Then, f(Ri; Ri0) > f(Ri = Ri0 ; Ri0) for any Ri > Ri0 ; hence (11) holds if g(Uj0)  f(Ri =
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Ri0 ; Ri0) =
R2
i0(h)
4cj0
 

Ri0
r
2(h)Uj0
cj0
  2Uj0

 0. It is easy to check that g(Uj0) is increasing
when Uj0 > bUi0j0, having its minimum at Uj0 = bUi0j0 where g(bUij0) = 0. Therefore, (11)
holds.
(b) Suppose that all stable contracts include a CBP: Equation (11) is implied by:
R2i(h)
2
2cj0
  Uj0 + R
2
i0(h)
2
2cj
  Uj > R
2
i(h)
2
2cj
  Uj + R
2
i0(h)
2
2cj0
  Uj0
i.e., 
R2i  R2i0
  1
cj0
  1
cj

> 0;
which always holds.
(c) We now consider that the existing contracts areW ISsi;mj(Uj) andW
CBP
si0 ;mj0
(Uj0). We show
that they can not be part of a stable outcome if and only if we prove that
si0 (W
IS
si0 ;mj
(Uj)) + si(W
CBP
si;mj0
(Uj0)) > si(W
IS
si;mj
(Uj)) + si0 (W
CBP
si0 ;mj0
(Uj0)) (12)
since either (si0 ;mj) or (si;mj0) can do better than under the original contracts. Given
that Uj is the level of utility obtained by mj; and (si;mj) sign an IS contract, it is
necessarily the case that Uj  bUij. Also, Ri > Ri0 implies that Uj  bUi0j. Therefore, we
can rewrite (12) as:
Ri0
s
2(h)Uj
cj
  2Uj + R
2
i(h)
2
2cj0
  Uj0 > Ri
s
2(h)Uj
cj
  2Uj + R
2
i0(h)
2
2cj0
  Uj0 ;
i.e., 
R2i  R2i0
 (h)2
2cj0
> [Ri  Ri0 ]
s
2(h)Uj
cj
;
or,
Uj <

Ri +Ri0
2
2
[(h)2]
2
2(h)
cj
c2j0
: (13)
For the contractWCBPsi0 ;mj0 (Uj0) to be optimal, it is necessarily the case (according to Propo-
sition 4) that Uj0  Ui0j0 : Since Uj < Uj0 (see Lemma 8), Uj < Ui0j0. Therefore, equation
(13) certainly holds if Ui0j0 is lower or equal than the right-hand side of (13). We claim
that this is the case. Indeed, when V ar(h)  1
3
(h)2,
Ui0j0 =
R2i0
cj0
hp
(h) p(h)  (h)2i2
2


Ri +Ri0
2
2
[(h)2]
2
2(h)
cj
c2j0
()"
(h) p(h)p(h)  (h)2
(h)2
#2


Ri +Ri0
2Ri0
2
cj
cj0
:
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While the right-hand side of the last equation is always larger than 1; given that Ri > Ri0
and cj > cj0, the left-hand side is smaller or equal than 1 if and only if:
(h)
(h)2
 
s
(h)
(h)2
s
(h)
(h)2
  1  1() (h)
(h)2
  1 
s
(h)
(h)2
s
(h)
(h)2
  1()s
(h)
(h)2
  1 
s
(h)
(h)2
which always holds. The claim when V ar(h) 2 (1
3
(h)2; (h)2) is equivalent to:
R2i0
2cj0

(h)2   (h)
2



Ri +Ri0
2
2
[(h)2]
2
2(h)
cj
c2j0
()
(h)
(h)2
  1
2

(h)
(h)2
2


Ri +Ri0
2Ri0
2
cj
cj0
:
The left-hand side of the equation is always lower than 1. Hence, equation (12) holds and
the initial contracts can not be part of a stable outcome.
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